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Abstract. This article presents a new and robust watermarking method in the
frequency domain  that improves over the existing ones. It is robust to JPEG
compression, very configurable, simple, efficient and very easy to implement.
Apart from JPEG test, it shows very good results in all  tests applied.
1 Introduction
The development of digital technologies has made possible the transmission and
storage of big multimedia information amounts. This is made at low costs, without
quality loses and efficiently. This good news brings also new dangers. Multimedia
creators are worried about their intellectual property rights [1,6] because, nowadays,
it is not only possible but also easy to make several copies of any work [7]. A clear
example of this is music stored in CD’s. It is possible to make a high quality copy of a
CD with a PC in less than half an hour. Furthermore the cost can be less than 5% of
the original. Watermarking could be an accurate solution for protecting intellectual
property rights of any kind, including images, audio, and video.
2 Our algorithm
Our watermarking method focuses on digital images. It works in the frequency domain
(in the Discrete Cosine Transformed (DCT) domain to be exact). Working in that
domain makes our method more resistant to JPEG compression attacks than if we
work directly over the pixels space domain. In this sense, Cox work [3,4] is
remarkable because it is one of the firsts that proposes to embed watermarks in
perceptually significant components of a signal, in order to get higher robustness and
to avoid quality loses.
Two requirements are needed to use watermarking techniques: imperceptibility and
robustness against image processing algorithms and forgery attacks [2]. Our proposal,
called Sonya, tries to improve the current models. The main advantages of this new
method versus famous Langelaar one [6] are:
· Better resistance to JPEG compression and to other attacks, getting a better
detector response with the same quality factor Q. In order to achieve this target we
use lower frequency coefficients than other approaches.
· Easy to use.
· Good execution speed
Let us explain how it works. We have an image we want to mark. We can divide it,
for instance, in blocks of 8x8 pixels. These blocks will be our 8x8 DCT blocks when
we transform the data to the frequency domain. The tag or watermark is made by a bit
series as follows: L0,L1…..Ln. The tag can represent information about the owner, or
the input to a data base table where copyright data are related to the owner, etc.
The algorithm modifies different coefficients if the bit that is supposed to be
embedded is “1” or “0”. In order to have a watermark that can resist possible attacks,
low frequency coefficients are the modified ones. The way this is done is establishing
its value to 0. This variation allows us to identify the marked coefficients later
because under a threshold next to 0 (U_detection) they are considered marked. We
should choose a marking threshold (U_marked) with the feature that no 8x8 DCT
block with a value over it is marked. Only those 8x8 DCT blocks under this threshold
are marked.
One of the main features of 8x8 DCT blocks is that their frequencies are ordered the
way the following figure shows:
Figure 1: Ordination of 8×8 block of DCT coefficients. AC is the coefficient
associated with the highest frequency and DC with the lowest
2.1 Marking Process
The marking process works this way:
• If the tag-bit we want to embed is “1” the shadowed coefficients in the
following figure (Diagonal_one), shown as an example, are modified
establishing its value to 0.
            Figure 2: Coefficients that has to be modified in order to embed Li = 1
 If we establish the value Diagonal_one = | C(0,1) | + | C(1,0) |,
 to modify the coefficients it must be true that:
 Diagonal_one  ≤ U_marked      C(0,1) = 0 and C(1,0) = 0.
 Else, we should go ahead with next 8x8 DCT block.
 Guessing an U_marked = 600
 Diagonal _ one  = 132 + 411,9 = 543,9 < 600
 The sum of the absolute values of the 2 coefficients (Diagonal_one) is lower than
U_marked, so we mark:
 Before marking C(0,1) = -132   After marking C(0,1) = 0.
 Before marking C(1,0) = 411,9   After marking C(1,0) = 0.
 
 
• If the bit of the tag we like to embed is “0” we modify the shadowed
coefficients in the following figure (Diagonal_zero) establishing its value to
0.
Figure  3: Coefficients that have to be modified if we want to embed Li = 0
If we establish the value Diagonal_zero = | C(1,1) | + | C(2,0) |, in order to modify the
shadowed coefficients we have to proceed this way:
If Diagonal_zero  ≤ U_marked      C(1,1) = 0 and C(2,0) = 0.
Else, we go ahead with the next 8x8 DCT block.
Guessing the same U_marked = 600 as we did in the last case:
 | C(1,1) | + | C(2,0) | = 61.9 + 115.6 = 177,5 < 600
The sum of the absolute values of both coefficients is lower than U_marked, so we
proceed to mark:
Before marking C(1,1) = -61,9   After marking C(1,1) = 0.
Before marking C(2,0) = 115,6   After marking C(2,0) = 0.
2.2 Detection Process
We choose an U_detection next to 0 under which the 8x8 DCT block is considered
marked. Now we have two possibilities:
If Diagonal_one  ≤ Diagonal_zero and Diagonal_one ≤ U_detection
 
 
  Li (bit to extract) = 1
If Diagonal_zero < Diagonal_one and Diagonal_zero ≤ U_detection
 
 
 Li (bit to extract) = 0.
We have only a problem to solve. Let us observe the following 8x8 DCT block:
Figure  4: DCT  problematic coefficients
If we like to embed a 1, we should proceed as we did in the example of figure 2
modifying C(0,1) and C(1,1). The problem is that after opening the image for
marking it, apply the DCT to it and the IDCT (inverse DCT), the values of the
marked coefficients are not 0. They have been softly disturbed to a value next to zero.
During detection process, if the sum of |C(1,1)| + |C(2,0)| has a high value, much
higher than 0, there is no problem, but what happens if the sum of |C(1,1)| + |C(2,0)|
has a value very close to 0?
The values of Diagonal_one and Diagonal_zero after marking will be very low,
close to zero and very similar between them. This produces an ambiguous situation
while detection, because it is perfectly possible to detect a 1 when a 0 was embedded
and the other way round.
To solve the problem, we have raised the value of the non-modified coefficient pair in
the marking process, if they are under U_marked. We define an increment, and we
have two possible situations:
If we mark Diagonal_one and the value of Diagonal_zero ≤ U_marked
 
Diagonal_zero = Diagonal_zero + increment.
If we mark Diagonal_zero and the value of Diagonal_one ≤ U_marked
 
Diagonal_one = Diagonal_one + increment.
Increasing the value of the non-marked diagonal when it is under the marking
threshold, it is guaranteed that it goes away from 0 in the detection process,
decreasing the probability of wrong positive results.
Let us show the marking algorithm more in detail.
2.3 Marking Algorithm Revisited
The steps of the algorithm are the following:
• We establish the values of these parameters:
• U_ marked : limit under which we proceed to mark an 8x8 DCT  block.
• increment : quantity that is added to the non marked coefficients under U_
marked.
• The counter i of the 8x8 DCT blocks is initialized to 0. The counter j of tag-bits is
initialized to 0.
• An 8x8 DCT block, bi
  
is selected from the image I in order to embed Lj .
• If Lj is 1,
 If | C(0,1) | + | C(1,0) | ≤ U_marked 

 C(0,1) = 0 and C(1,0) = 0
 If | C(1,1) | + | C(2,0) | ≤ U_marked 

 If  C(1,1)  ≥ 0   C(1,1) = C(1,1) + increment
 else,  C(1,1) = C(1,1) - increment
 else while there are DCT 8x8 blocks i is increased and we go again to step 3.
• If Lj is 0,
 If | C(1,1) | + | C(2,0) | ≤ U_marked  
 
 C(1,1) = 0 and C(2,0) = 0
 If | C(0,1) | + | C(1,0) | ≤ U_marked  
 
 If C(0,1) ≥ 0   C(0,1) = C(0,1) + increment
 else C(0,1) = C(0,1) - increment
 else while there are DCT 8x8 blocks i  is increased and we go again to step 3.
• While there are DCT 8x8 blocks j and i are increased . We go again to step3.
• There are no more 8x8 DCT blocks to mark   End.
2.4 Tag Extraction Algorithm
The steps of the extraction algorithm are the following:
1. First we establish some parameters:
o U_detection : an 8x8 DCT block is considered marked under this
limit.
o T: is the difference between the percentage of detected bits in a
truly embedded mark and the percentage detected in one or more
that are not. Normally the detector response for false positives is
under 20, that is why we can use a value for T = 20 or 25.
o False_password_0 ... False_password_n : we establish the value or
values for the false passwords. They generate marks that will not be
on the false images.
2. We initialize the number of detected bits, detected_bits = 0. The counter i of 8x8
DCT blocks is initialized to 0. The counter of tag-bit j is initialized to 0.
3. An 8x8 DCT block , bi
  
is selected from the image I to extract Lj .
4. If | C(0,1) | + | C(1,0) | ≤ | C(1,1) | + | C(2,0) |
and | C(0,1) | + | C(1,0) | ≤ U_ detection  
 
Lj = 1 detected_bits = detected_bits + 1
We increase j.
Else,
If |C(1,1) | + | C(2,0) | < | C(0,1) | + | C(1,0) |
and | C(1,1) | + | C(2,0) | ≤ U_ detection    Lj = 0  detected_bits = detected_bits + 1.
We increase j.
5. While there are 8x8 DCT blocks, i is increased and we go to point 3.
• We have finished with 8x8 DCT blocks. Steps from 1..5 are executed with all
the wrong passwords getting the average bit number. Steps from 1..5 are also
executed for the password we want to detect the mark with and we keep the
value in  detected.
• If 100 – ((average x 100) /  detected) >= T      Watermark detected !
else     Watermark not detected.
• If the condition is true and the mark is detected then the difference between
the number of detected bits on the tag extracted and the not embedded mark
average is higher than T %. Normally, the response to a mark that is really
embedded is about 50 % and the response to a mark that is not is under 20.
That is why a threshold T equal or higher than 20 can be used in the
detection process.
3 Results
 We have analyzed three different images: lenna.ppm, sabatini.ppm and mandril.ppm.
 Their features are different (colour scales, high frequency zones, defined borders…)
so it is very useful to compare the results over them. We have figures for all the
results but we are forced not to show most of them because the space restrictions of
this article. Let us take only a quick look on the results:
3.1 Invisibility of the watermarking
 U_marked guarantees the invisibility of the watermark. If we choose this limit too
high the watermark would be visible, so we have to look for a limit that adapts to the
image features. U_marked should allow us to modify many low frequency
coefficients guaranteeing the invisibility of the mark. Other parameter that has an
important influence in the visibility of the mark is increment. In this case a higher
value of increment produces a higher distortion in certain coefficients making the
  Figure 5: Lenna image marked with U_marked = 15, increment =15
 
mark more visible. As we can see in the image above, using U_marked = 15,
increment = 15 we get a mark completely invisible. We have gotten similar results
for the other images.
3.2 Mark Uniqueness
Uniqueness test is passed easily. Testing 1000 random marks we can observe that only
one is really embedded. The detector’s response to this mark stands out the rest. The
results are shown in the following figure.
 
  Figure  6: Detector Response to 1000 random watermarks, only 1 of them
embedded
 
The used parameters for Lenna image were: U_marked = 15, Increment = 15,
U_detection = 5, T = 25. In this case the detector response is clear. While non-
embedded marks have a response between 10 and  –10,  the response to the
embedded mark is 50.
 
For the image Sabatini, the chosen parameters are U_marked = 20, Increment = 20,
U_ detection = 5, T = 25. In the case of the embedded mark, 376 bits of 377
embedded bits are detected. In the rest of random marks, the response moves around
188 bits.
 
 
The results for the image  Mandrill  are also satisfactory. The parameters used with
Mandrill are U_marked = 20, Increment = 20, U_detection = 5
 
 3.3 Multiple Watermark Detection
 
 
The Sonya algorithm has the same problems Langelaar’s has. The process of
watermarking applied many times modifies the same DCT coefficients, so a mark
alters the coefficients that other mark has just modified. This makes very difficult the
detection process. The solution is to choose different coefficients for each mark we
want to embed, using other diagonals.
 
 
 
 
Random marks
  Figure 7: Detector response to 1000 watermarks, 5 embedded
• The response to 5 embedded marks is higher than the response to the rest of
random marks. Although this is true, we must remark that there is one
without a clear value because we need a very low threshold T = 15 for its
detection. For instance a threshold T = 25 would only detect 3 of the 5
marks. Therefore we can say that embedding more than five images can get
us into trouble during the detection process.
• For Sabatini image only 3 of the 5 five embedded marks are over a threshold
T = 25. For lower T we can detect 5 embedded marks but also some that are
not embedded.
•  For  Mandrill image the five embedded marks are over the threshold T =25.
3.4 JPEG Compression
The results allow us to detect a watermark with quite low compression levels as it is
shown in the figure. We used a threshold (T = 20) quite safe in the preceding image.
This means that marks with a response over 20% are detected. In this case the mark is
detected even using a quality factor Q = 20. For lower quality factors, the detector
response is too low ought to the presence of false positive and false negative results
after the distortion that compression makes. Watching the figure, the mark is detected
for all quality factors Q which blue line is over the pink one. In the case of Sabatini
and Mandrill images there are no doubts with quality factors Q over 15.
 
Random marks
Figure  8: Detector response against JPEG compression
3.5 Strength Against Filters
Figure  9: Lenna detector response after filter application
We have obtained excellent results in this test. The detector response is very high for
the three images and the mark is detected in all cases with a threshold T =30,
Detector response
Detection threshold
Detector response
Defocus
Focus
Grey scale
16 colours
256 colours
Noise
Middle-step
excluding a negative case in 16 colour reduction in Mandrill image where the
response is relatively low, with a value of  17,72. In order to solve this problem we
can mark the blue channel of the image or look for stronger marking parameters. Let
us show Lenna results:
3.5 Rotation, Scaled and Reescaled
For the rotation, if we know the spinning angle, when we revert the operation the
mark is clearly detected, getting the same results in the detection process as we get
with the original marked image.
The rescaling test presents higher difficulties to detect the mark. In this case, the
image loses quality. With our images when we reduce the images and we turn to the
original size, the results have been the following:
For Lenna image the mark is lost after reducing it to a 60% of its original size.
Nevertheless the image loses quality notably.
For Sabatini image we get excellent results. The mark is not lost until we reduce it to
30 %. But if we do that, the image remains totally deteriorated.
In all cases the image resist to an 80% of the original reduction at least.
For the cutting out test the mark is detected with a threshold over T = 20 getting a
response in the detector of 21,67 in Mandrill case. Of course the results are
completely conditioned to the cut size. As bigger the cut is, smaller is the detector
response.
3.5 Watermark Collision
We have marked 15 images with different passwords for this test. The detector
response has been the following.
Figure  10: Detector response to different one-mark collisions
As shown, the mark is detected over a threshold  T = 25 for all the tested cases.
Figure  11: Detector response to each collision watermark
Number of marks used in the collision
Also,  when we used 15 marked images in the collision, all of them were detected.
In Sabatini case only a response (with value 20) is under the threshold T = 25. This
means we should establish T = 20. This threshold is not as reliable as the other but it
can be useful if we look at the probability of false positive results at the uniqueness
test. Three marks remain under T = 25. Two of them under 20 and the other is not
detected because has a 0 response. The solution is looking for other marking
parameters. In the Mandrill case the mark is detected for T = 25 in all cases.
Summing up we can say that our method gets better results for bigger images because
they use to have a higher number of marking coefficients.
3.6 Stirmark
Although the response is quite good in most of Stirmark attacks, there are cases in
which we can remove the watermark making the detector response to descend to 10.
Nevertheless, the difference between the marked image and the one that is not is
clearly visible, as it is shown in the following figures.
Figure  12: Lenna image marked  before Stirmark application
              Figure  13: Lenna image marked  after Stirmark application
4 Conclusions
The importance of watermarking for protecting the intellectual property of
multimedia data is clear. New ideas and its development appear to be essential. No
current method is free from weaknesses. So we have to work in order to improve
them day-by-day. Furthermore, the way data is transferred by the Internet changes
very fast and the methods should be strong enough in order to adapt to these changes.
The main advantages of the exposed method are:
• Easy implementation: The marking and detection code together has less than
300 lines.
• Good efficiency: The implementation of the algorithm is very fast. As an
example we can say that for a 535 KB image, the marking process consumes
less than a second. (Tests made on a Pentium III, 800 MHz and 128 MB
RAM).
• The code is written in standard ANSI C providing portability for Linux and
Windows platforms.
• A very important difference versus other methods is that we use blind
techniques. The original image is not required in the detection process. This
is very important because we do not always have the original image. The
flexibility of the presented method allows using it as a non-blind method. In
this case the strength of Sonya method is still higher and we can use Trusted
Third Parties (TTP) for the custody of the original image, passwords and
data related to the image owner.
• Other remarkable point is that our watermarks are public or recoverable
because we can extract the mark information bit by bit. This feature is very
important because we can know the data owner just in the moment we
extract the mark. We do not have to look in a database. Again the flexibility
of this method allows a private implementation in order to just detect the
mark in the image. In both cases if the attacker wants to recover/detect the
mark has to own the password used in the marking process.
 
• With no doubts the main achievement of our method is the good response to
all the tests done.
Let us summarize our results:
• The watermark invisibility is guaranteed by the marking parameters.
According to our interests we can establish if a mark will be visible or not.
Obviously a visible mark that destroys the image is not interesting, but
sometimes it is better a watermark slightly visible and almost imperceptible
that provides us higher strength.
• Considering the JPEG compression test as one of the main ones, the results
are excellent because the watermark embedded is even detected under a
compression factor Q = 30.
• The uniqueness test also shows great results and the watermark is clearly
detected using 1000 random marks. Therefore the false positive probability
is almost zero in the tests done. This test allows us to guess which is the best
value for the detection threshold. Consequently over a certain detection
threshold we are completely sure that the detected mark has been really
embedded, and not detected marks have not.
• Some modifications to our method are necessary in order to detect multiple
watermarks. This happens because marking an image many times often
needs to modify the same DCT coefficients.
• Filter application does not seem a serious threat because a strong filter
produces distortion in the image when removing the mark. We have used
standard filters that any attacker can use with programs that modify images.
• Rotation presents no problem if we know the spinning angle. In this case we
detect the mark in all the tests we have made, after undoing the operation.
• The scale and cutting out processes highly depend on the image. They can
destroy a mark but they distort the image. In these circumstances what we
have to value is if the quality of the image is accurate.
• Watermark collision has the same problems multiple marks have, but
nevertheless the results are good. If we realize that an attacker must have
many marked images in order to remove the watermark, the results appear to
be even better.
 
• The more difficult test in watermarking use to be the Stirmark one. We have
to say that Stirmark removes our watermark but the resultant image is
distorted and clearly different from the original.
We have shown that our method improves over the existing ones in what is related to
the watermark of digital images. Anyway, there is still quite a lot of work to do in
order to get even better results, and to apply similar ideas and philosophy to video
and audio watermarking.
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